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I. INTRODUCrION

In EasternAirlines, Inc. v. Floyd,1 the United States Supreme Court held
that Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention,' which sets forth the conditions
under which an international air carrier can be held liable for injuries to
passengers, does not allow recovery for mental or psychic injuries unaccompanied by physical injury or physical manifestation of injury.3 The Court
did not, however, express a view as to whether passengers can recover for
mental injuries that are accompanied by physical injuries.4 In the four years
since the Floyd decision, a number of lower federal courts have addressed
this issue. This Note analyzes the various approaches that these courts have
adopted.
As background, there is a discussion of the Warsaw Convention, a review
of the type of cases that led up to Floyd and a synopsis of the Floyd decision
itself. The main focus of this Note, an analysis of the various approaches
courts have adopted as to whether passengers can recover for emotional
distress that is accompanied by bodily injury in Warsaw Convention cases,
follows.

* J.D., 1996.

499 U.S. 530 (1991).

2 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation

by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Warsaw Convention].
3 Floyd, 499 U.S. at 552.
4
id.
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Warsaw Convention governs the international carriage of passengers,
baggage and cargo by air and regulates the liability of international air
carriers.
The 1929 treaty applies only to international flights.6 The
Convention was the result of an international conference held in Paris in
1925, the work done by the interim Comit6 International Technique
d'Experts Juridique A6riens (a committee created by the Paris Conference)
and of a second conference held in Warsaw in 1929.' Although initially
signed by only twenty-three countries, the Warsaw Convention is now, due
to the remarkable growth of civil aviation since 1929, recognized by over
120 nations, making it both a widely recognized and significant international
agreement.'
The purpose of the Warsaw Convention was twofold.9 First, recognizing
that air travel traverses national boundaries and involves varying languages,
customs and legal systems, the participants believed that uniform rules
governing parties to international air carriage contracts would be beneficial.1 ° The second goal of the Convention was to limit the liability of air
carriers and thus help promote the growth of an industry in its infancy. 1
The Warsaw Convention did, to some extent, achieve its goal of
eliminating the uncertain legal implications of international air travel. 2 The
terms of the original treaty established a presumption that air carriers were
liable for passengers' damages resulting from negligent conduct. 3 In order

5

Gregory C. Sisk, Recovery for Emotional Distress Under the Warsaw Convention: The

Elusive Search for the French Meaning of Ldsion Corporelle, 25 TEX. INT'L L.J. 127, 129

(1990).
6 Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 1.

Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allan I. Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw

Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497, 498 (1967).
8 Dafna Yoran, Comment, Recovery of Emotional Damages Under Article 17 of the
Warsaw Convention: The American Versus the IsraeliApproach, 18 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 811,

814 (1992).
9 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 7, at 498.
' Id.; Yoran, supra note 8, at 814; Sheila Wallace Holmes, Casenote, 58 J. AIR L. &
COM. 1205, 1207 (1993).
" Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 7, at 499; Holmes, supra note 10, at 1207-08.
12Dale M. Eaton, Note, Recovery for Purely Emotional Distress Under the Warsaw
Convention: Narrow Construction of Usion Corporelle in Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd,

1993 Wis. L. REV. 563, 569.
13 Id.
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to counterbalance this presumption, the liability of air carriers was strictly
limited (except in cases of willful misconduct) to $8,300 per passenger.' 4
Moreover, carriers could rebut this presumption by showing that all possible
safety measures had been taken to avoid harm to passengers."
Although the United States did not participate in the original drafting of
the Warsaw Convention,1 6 the Senate ratified the Convention on June 15,
1934," and the United States officially joined the treaty on October 29 of
that year when President Franklin D. Roosevelt proclaimed the nation's
adherence to it.1 8
The significant limits on air carrier liability prompted sharp criticism and
debate among the signatories almost immediately after the Warsaw
Convention went into effect. 9 Because of this dissatisfaction, the parties
to the treaty met at the Hague in 1955 to consider its revision.' The result
was the Hague Protocol. 2' The primary effect of the Protocol was to
increase the limit on air carrier liability to $16,600.22 The Hague Protocol
also redefined certain terms, simplified some documents of carriage, provided
for awarding costs of litigation and made the Convention applicable to agents
and servants of the carriers.' The United States and other parties to the
Warsaw Convention continued to express opposition to the limit on liability
even after it was doubled and never adhered to the Protocol. 24
Because of its continued discontent over the low recovery limits under the
Warsaw Convention, the United States gave notice of its denunciation of the

14 id.

Id.
I5

6

' The following countries participated in the original drafting of the Warsaw Convention:
Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland,
France, the German Reich, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland and the
British Dominions, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Rumania, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Venezuela and Yugoslavia. Eaton,
supra note 12, at 570 n.27.
17 Yoran, supra note 8, at 815.
'8Eaton, supra note 12, at 570.
19Id.
20Id.
21 Protocol Amending the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating
to
International Carriage by Air, Sept. 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371 [hereinafter Hague Protocol].
' Yoran, supra note 8, at 816.

2 LAWRENCE B. GOLDHIRSCH, THE WARSAW CONVENTION ANNOTATED:

HANDBOOK
24

6 (1988).

Eaton, supra note 12, at 570.
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Convention on November 15, 1965.' As a result of this notice, a special
meeting of contracting states was called in Montreal in February of 1966 to
find a solution that would convince the United States to withdraw its
impending denunciation, scheduled for May 16, 1966.26 The solution to the
problem came in the form of the Montreal Agreement,2 7 which is in essence
a contract between consenting carriers and passengers whose tickets have
points of departure, destination or agreed stopping points in the United
States.' The Agreement's most important impact was to raise the limit of
air carrier liability to $75,000.29 It also abolished the negligence standard
of the original Warsaw Convention and replaced it with a new policy of
strict liability for damages to passengers, cargo and baggage.' Further, the
Montreal Agreement required that air carriers provide passengers with notice
of the limits on air carrier liability. 3' Because of the Agreement, the United
States withdrew its notice of denunciation of the Warsaw Convention on
May 13, 1966.32
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The parties to the Warsaw Convention first met in Paris; the authentic text
of the Convention is, as a result, written in French. 3 Thus, the French text
must guide courts' analysis when interpreting any provision of the treaty.'
American courts have found that using the French text to analyze the
Convention is difficult. In particular, the courts have been frustrated in

' Id. at 570-71; Yoran, supra note 8, at 816.
' Yoran, supra note 8, at 816. The threatened denunciation by the United States was of
great concern to other countries because a major portion of all international air carriers and
passengers were American in 1965. Donald M. Haskell, The Warsaw System and the U.S.
Constitution Revisited, 39 J. AIR L. & COM. 483, 487 (1973).
" Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and the Hague
Protocol, Agreement C.A.B. 18900, approved by C.A.B. Order No. E-28680, May 13, 1966,
31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966), reprinted in ANDRFAS F. LOWFNFELD, AVIATION LAW
DOCUMENTS 971 (Supp. 1981) [hereinafter Montreal Agreement].
2 GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 23, at 7.
29id.
'0 Yoran, supra note 8, at 816-17.
" Id. at 817.
32 id.

33 Lisa A. Fromm, Note, Eastern Airlines v. Floyd: Airline PassengersDenied Recovery
for Emotional Distress Under the Warsaw Convention, 25 AKRON L. REV. 425, 426 (1991).
34 l at 426-27.
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attempts to reach definitive interpretations of Article 17 of the treaty.
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention sets forth the conditions under
which an international air carrier can be held liable for injuries to passengers.35 The official American translation of Article 17, as employed by the
Senate when it ratified the Convention in 1934, reads as follows:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the
event of the death or wounding of a passenger or any other
bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident which
caused the damage so sustained took place on board the
aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.36
This translation has been repeatedly disputed by the courts since the
1970s 37 in their efforts to determine whether the original French text allows
recovery for mental distress unaccompanied by physical injuries.38
In 1991, the United States Supreme Court decided Eastern Airlines, Inc.
v. Floyd,39 the landmark case involving the issue of whether Article 17 of
the Warsaw Convention allows recovery for mental or psychic injuries
unaccompanied by physical injury or physical manifestation of injury. The
Court granted certiorari to hear that case because of the confusion in

3-

Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 397 (1985).

Id. The authentic French text of Article 17 reads as follows:
Le transporteur est responsable du dommage survenu en cas de mort,
de blessure ou de toute autre lision corporelle subie par un voyageur
lorsque l'accident qui a caus6 le dommage s'est produit A bord de
l'adronef ou au cours de toutes opdrations d'embarquement et de
debarquement.
Id. at n.2.
37 The dispute did not arise until the 1970s because American courts did not originally
view the Warsaw Convention as creating a cause of action. Holmes, supra note 10, at 1209.
Rather, courts first interpreted the Convention as simply limiting monetary damages on
otherwise applicable law. Id. Courts thus viewed the treaty as creating only a presumption
of liability, instead of an independent cause of action. Id. at 1209-10. It was not until the
late 1970s that courts began to construe the Warsaw Convention as the "universal source of
a right of action." Id. at 1210 (quoting Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d
3

913, 919 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979)).
3

Yoran, supra note 8, at 818.

" 499 U.S. at 530.
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For example, in Burnett v.

Trans World Airlines, Inc.," one of the cases leading to Floyd, the court
held that Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention does not encompass purely
43
psychic damages. 42 In contrast, Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co.
allowed recovery for purely psychic injuries under Article 17.44
In Burnett, the plaintiffs boarded a Trans World Airlines flight from
Athens to New York in September of 1970.' 5 After boarding additional
passengers in Frankfurt, the plane was hijacked by members of the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine, who diverted the aircraft to Jordan,
forcing it to land on a dry lake bed in the desert outskirts of Amman.4
The plaintiffs claimed that they feared for their lives during their period of
captivity and thus that they experienced severe emotional trauma.4'
The plaintiffs sued TWA for their purely emotional distress under Article
17 of the Warsaw Convention.48 The parties agreed that the Warsaw
Convention and the Montreal Agreement applied, that an accident did in fact
take place4 9 and that to the extent Article 17 enumerated injuries alleged by
the plaintiffs, TWA's liability could only be based on the Convention and in
any event would be limited to $75,000."°
40 Id at 534.
41368 F. Supp. 1152 (D.N.M. 1973).
42 I. at 1158. Other courts that have held that Article 17 does not encompass purely
psychic damages include: Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 351 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y.
1972), aff'd, 485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973); Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 314 N.E.2d
848 (Ct. App. N.Y. 1974).
' 388 F. Supp. 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
44
at 1250. Other courts that have allowed recovery for purely psychic injuries under
Article 17 include: Borham v. Pan American World Airways, No. 85 Civ. 6922 (CBM), 1986
WL 2974 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 1986); Karfunkel v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 427 F.
Supp. 971 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Krystal v. British Overseas Airways Corp., 403 F. Supp. 1322
(C.D. Cal. 1975); Palagonia v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 442 N.Y.S.2d 670 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
45 Burnett, 368 F. Supp. at 1153.
46 m
47id.
4 Id.
4 See Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 405-06 (1985) (holding "that liability under
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention arises only if a passenger's injury is caused by an
unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to the passenger," and not where
"the injury indisputably results from the passenger's own internal reaction to the usual,
normal, and expected operation of the aircraft," in which case it has not been caused by an
accident under Article 17).
" Burnett, 368 F. Supp. at 1153-54.
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The court held that damages for mental anguish alone could not be
recovered under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention." After rejecting the
plaintiffs' argument that the tort law of New Mexico should control the
scope of the phrase "bodily injury", the court looked to the French legal
meaning of the term for guidance.52 The court noted that French law
distinguishes sharply between "bodily injury" ("ldsion corporelle") and
"mental injury" ("16sion mentkle") and consequently decided that the two
phrases were mutually exclusive.53 To support this conclusion, the court
relied on Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co.,5' where another district court
proceeded under similar analysis.55 In addition, the court examined the
legislative history of the Convention and found a strong inference that the
drafters intended to exclude recovery for purely
emotional distress by using
56
corporelle".
"l6sion
of
definition
a narrow
To further support its conclusion that mental anguish alone does not fall
within the reach of "l6sion corporelle", the court analogized the Berne
Convention on International Rail Transport.57 The court explained that the
first draft of the Berne Convention closely paralleled the language of Article
17 of the Warsaw Convention and permitted recovery for bodily injury only
and that the Berne Convention allowed recovery for mental injuries only

51Id. at 1158.
52

i

at 1155.

The court explained, "[Tihe meaning of the Warsaw Convention is a

matter of federal law. It is a sovereign treaty and as such is the supreme law of the land,
preempting local law in the areas where it applies. United States Constitution, Art. VI, cl.
2; United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 57 S.Ct. 758, 81 L. Ed. 1134 (1937); Smith v.
Canadian Pacific Airways, Ltd., 452 F.2d 798 (2d Cir. 1971)." I1&
5 Id. at 1156.
54351 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aftrd, 485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973). This decision
should not be confused with Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238 (S.D.N.Y.
1975), which is discussed infra.
55Burnett, 368 F. Supp. at 1156.
5'6
Id. at 1157. The court explained:
By thus restricting recovery to bodily injuries, the inference is strong

that the Convention intended to narrow the otherwise broad scope of
liability under the former draft and preclude recovery for mental anguish
alone. Had the delegates decided otherwise, there would have been no
reason to so substantially modify the proposed draft of the First Conference.
Id.

m id.

GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.

[Vol. 24:501

after it was modified by the addition of the words "ou mente"5
The facts of Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co. 59 are strikingly similar
to those of Burnett. In Husserl, the plaintiff boarded a Swiss Air direct
flight from Zurich to New York in September of 1970.'
Shortly after
takeoff, members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
hijacked the plane and directed the pilot to fly to a desert area near
Amman.6 Once there, the plaintiff was forced to stay on the plane for
approximately twenty-four hours under circumstances "less than ideal for...
mental health."'62
Once she returned to New York, the plaintiff filed suit under the Warsaw
Convention, alleging that from the time the terrorists took control of the
aircraft until she returned to Zurich she suffered "severe mental pain and
anguish resulting from her expectation of severe injury and/or death."63
Swiss Air filed a motion for summary judgement, contending that the
plaintiff could not recover under the Warsaw Convention because her injuries
were purely emotional ones. 64
In determining whether the phrase "en cas de mort, de blessure ou de toute
autre lesion corporelle" ("in the event of the death or wounding.., or any
other bodily injury") comprehended mental and psychosomatic injuries, the
court attempted to ascertain the intention of the drafters and signatories of
the Warsaw Convention, instead of following other courts that had concluded
that " 'the binding meaning of the terms (of the Convention) is the French
legal meaning.' "65 The court was, however, unable to ascertain the
specific intent of the Convention's framers and thus concluded "that the
parties probably had no specific intention at all about mental and psychosomatic injuries because, if they had, they would have clearly expressed their
intentions."' The court therefore construed "bodily injury" to be consistent

5

Id

388 F. Supp. 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
r° Id at 1242.
6' Id.; Hijackers Win Release of 6 of 7 Guerrillas; 184 Passengers Still Held; 747 Is
Blown Up, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 1970, at 3.
62 Husserl, 388 F. Supp. at 1242.
63id.
64id.
6 Id. at 1248-49 (quoting Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 351 F. Supp. 702, 708
(S.D.N.Y. 1972), affid, 485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973)).
6Id.
at 1249.
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509

with the purpose of the treaty, to create uniformity and limit liability. 7
Consequently, the court held "that the phrase 'death or wounding.., or any
other bodily injury,' as used in Article 17, does comprehend mental
injuries."" Importantly, this holding did not grant recovery for purely
emotional distress in every action pursued under Article 17, but rather
permitted recovery only where the applicable substantive law (the state law)
provided for such a cause of action.69

In 1990, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Eastern
Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd7 ° to resolve the question debated among lower
federal courts of whether Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention allows
recovery for mental or psychic injuries unaccompanied by physical injury or
physical manifestation of injury.7 ' The unanimous Court, in an opinion
written by Justice Thurgood Marshall, held that "an air carrier cannot be held
liable under Article 17 when an accident has not caused a passenger to suffer
67 Eaton, supra note 12, at 575. The court stated:
Although the draftsmen probably had no specific intent as to whether
Article 17 comprehended mental and psychosomatic injuries, they did
have a general intent to effect the purpose of the treaty and apparently
took some pains to make it comprehensive. That they may have
neglected one area should not vitiate the purpose of the Convention.
There is no evidence they intended to preclude recovery for any particular
type of injury. To regulate in a uniform manner the liability of the
carrier, they must have intended to be comprehensive. To effect the
treaty's avowed purpose, the types of injuries enumerated should be
construed expansively to encompass as many types of injury as are
colorably within the ambit of the enumerated types. Mental and
psychosomatic injuries are colorably within the ambit and are, therefore,
comprehended by Article 17.
Husserl, 388 F. Supp. at 1250.
6 Husserl, 388 F. Supp. at 1252.
69Eaton, supra note 12, at 576-77. Eaton also notes that the Husserl reasoning was
applied by the court in Krystal v. British Overseas Airways Corp., 403 F. Supp. 1322 (C.D.
Cal. 1975): "In Krystal, however, the court seemingly went further, holding that purely
mental injuries were compensable under Article 17 as a matter of law, without addressing
substantive California state law governing the recoverability of mental injuries alone." Eaton,
supra note 12, at 577.
70 499 U.S. at 530.
71Holmes, supra note 10, at 1205; Yoran, supra note 8, at 811. The Court stated, "We
granted certiorari to resolve a conflict between the Eleventh Circuit's decision in this case and
the New York Court of Appeals' decision in Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., which
held that purely psychic trauma is not compensable under Article 17." Floyd, 499 U.S. at 534
(citations omitted).
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death, physical injury, or physical manifestation of injury."72
The case arose out of a May 5, 1983, Eastern Airlines flight from Miami
to the Bahamas.7 3 Shortly after the plane took off, one of its three jet
engines lost oil pressure.7 4 The flight crew shut down the failed engine and
turned the plane around to return to Miami." Then, the plane's other two
engines failed due to loss of oil pressure.76 As the plane began losing
altitude rapidly, the passengers were informed that the plane would be
ditched in the Atlantic Ocean.' After a period of descending flight without
power, the crew was able to restart one of the engines and land the plane
safely at Miami International Airport.7"
A number of passengers on the flight brought separate complaints against
Eastern claiming damage solely for emotional distress arising out of the
accident.79 The district court consolidated the cases.'
Although Eastern
conceded that the engine failure and preparation for ditching the plane
constituted an accident under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, 8' they
argued that Article 17 makes physical injury a condition of liability. 2 The
district court relied on the Burnett court's analysis of the French authentic
text and negotiating history of the Convention and held that mental anguish
alone is not compensable under Article 17.83 After examining the French
legal meaning of the phrase "16sion corporelle", the concurrent and
subsequent history of the Warsaw Convention and cases interpreting Article
17, the circuit court reversed, concluding that the term "lesion corporelle" in
the authentic French text of Article 17 encompasses purely emotional
distress."

72 Floyd, 499 U.S. at 552.
73 Id. at 533.

74Id.
75Id.
76 Id.

7 Id.
78 Id.
79

id.

o Id. See In re Eastern Airlines, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 307 (S.D. Fla. 1986), rev'd sub nor.,

Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d 1462 (1 1th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991).
8 See discussion supra note 49.
8' Floyd, 499 U.S. at 533.
Id. at 533-34.
" Id. at 534. See Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d 1462 (11th Cir. 1989), rev'd,
499 U.S. 530 (1991).
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The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court, holding that Article 17 of
the Warsaw Convention does not allow recovery for mental injuries
unaccompanied by physical injury or physical manifestation of injury. 5
The Court examined the text of the Convention as well as its history,
negotiations and practical construction. 6
First, the Court considered the French legal meaning of "16sion corporelle"
to discern the expectations of the parties to the Warsaw Convention. 7
Upon consulting bilingual dictionaries, the Court found that "16sion
corporelle" is translated as "bodily injury", suggesting that Article 17 does
not permit recovery for purely psychic injuries.8 8 The Court then turned to
French legal materials.8 9 After a thorough examination of French legislation, cases and treatises, the Court found "neither that '16sion corporelle' was
a widely used term in French law nor that the term specifically encompassed
psychic injuries."'
Then, the Court examined the negotiating history of the Warsaw
Convention and determined that translating "16sion corporelle" as "bodily
injury" was consistent with that history. 91 A review of the documentary
record of the treaty revealed that neither the drafters nor the signatories
considered liability for psychic injury because most countries did not
recognize recovery for such injuries at the time.92 Justice Marshall thus
decided that the drafters probably would have made an unequivocal reference

Floyd,499 U.S. at 552.

IdMat 534-35.
at 536.
u Id. at 536-37.
89 Id. at 537.
'7Id.

90Id at 538. As the Court noted, "The only reports of French cases we did find that used
the term 'Idsion corporelle' are relatively recent and involve physical injuries caused by

automobile accidents and other incidents. These cases tend to support the conclusion that,
in French legal usage, the term '1dsion corporelle' refers only to physical injuries."

Id

(footnote omitted). Then, the Court dismissed the fact that in 1929 France, unlike many other
countries, permitted recovery for mental distress. Id at 539. The Court found that "this
general proposition of French tort law does not demonstrate that the specific phrase chosen
by the contracting parties-'1dsion corporelle'--covers purely psychic injury." Id To follow

up on this, the court stated its task: " 'to give the specific words of the treaty a meaning
consistent with the shared expectations of the contracting parties.' " Id at 540 (quoting Air
France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 399 (1985)).
"' Id. at 542.
9id. at 544.
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to purely mental injury if they had intended to allow such recovery. 93 The

Court then added, "The narrower reading of 'l6sion corporelle' also is
consistent with the primary purpose of the contracting parties to the
Convention: limiting the liability of air carriers in order to foster the growth
of the fledgling commercial aviation industry."'
The Court also found that the post-1929 conduct and interpretations of the
signatories supported a narrow translation of "l6sion corporelle"." First,
the Court mentioned a proposed substitution for the term that would have
broadened the scope of Article 17, but was not implemented." The Court
then went on to voice its disapproval of the circuit court's reliance on the
substitution of the term "bodily injury" for "personal injury" on passenger
tickets and in subsequent international agreements.'
Finally, the Court consulted a decision of the Supreme Court of Israel
(apparently the only judicial decision from another signatory addressing
recovery for purely emotional injuries under Article 17) which held that
Article 17 does allow recovery for purely psychic injuries. 9 The Supreme

Ild.at 545. The Court noted that "when the parties to a different international transport
treaty [the Berne Convention on International Rail Transport] wanted to make it clear that rail
passengers could recover for purely psychic harms, the drafters made a specific modification
to this effect." d
9 &dat 546.
9 Id.
9 Id. at 546-47; Eaton, supra note 12, at 581. The Court explained:
In 1951, a committee composed of 20 Warsaw Convention signatories
met in Madrid and adopted a proposal to substitute "affection corporelle"
for "ldsion corporelle" in Article 17. The French delegate to the
committee proposed this substitution because, in his view, the word
"lsion" was too narrow, in that it "presupposed a rupture in the tissue,
or a dissolution in continuity" which might not cover an injury such as
mental illness or lung congestion caused by the breakdown in the heating
apparatus of the aircraft. The United States delegate opposed this change
if it "implied the inclusion of mental injury or emotional disturbances or
upsets which were not connected with or the result of bodily injury," but
the committee adopted it nonetheless. Although the committee's
proposed amendment was never subsequently implemented, its discussion
and vote in Madrid suggest that, in the view of the 20 signatories on the
committee, "lesion corporelle" in Article 17 had a distinctively physical
scope.
Floyd, 499 U.S. at 546-47 (citations omitted).
97Floyd, 499 U.S. at 547-50; Eaton, supra note 12, at 581.
98Floyd, 499 U.S. at 550-51. See Air France v. Teichner, 38 (111) P.D. 785 (Isr. 1984).
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Court of Israel reasoned "that 'desirable jurisprudential policy' ... favored
an expansive reading of Article 17 to reach purely psychic injuries."" The
United States Supreme Court was not persuaded: "Even if we were to agree
that allowing recovery for purely psychic injury is desirable as a policy goal,
we cannot give effect to such policy without convincing evidence that the
signatories'
intent with respect to Article 17 would allow such recov100
ery.!9

The Court concluded its opinion by reiterating its holding that "an air
carrier cannot be held liable under Article 17 when an accident has not
caused a passenger to suffer death, physical injury, or physical manifestation
of injury."' ' The Court did not reach two other issues: 1) whether a
passenger can recover for mental injuries that are accompanied by physical
injuries and 2) whether the Warsaw Convention provides the exclusive cause
of action for injuries sustained during international air transportation. 1"
IV. ANALYSIS
There are four possible approaches to recovery for emotional distress that
is accompanied by bodily injury in a Warsaw Convention case. 3 The
first is to disallow recovery for emotional distress."' 4 The second approach
is to allow recovery for all emotional distress, as long as a bodily injury
occurs." 5 The third possibility is to allow emotional distress as damages
for bodily injury, including distress about the accident."
Lastly, a court
can allow
recovery only for emotional distress flowing from a bodily
7
injury."1

99Floyd, 499 U.S. at 551 (quoting Teichner, 38 (III) P.D. at 785).
100 Id.
'01 Id. at 552-53.
'0 Id. The question of whether the Warsaw Convention provides the exclusive cause of
action for injuries sustained during international flight is addressed in Luis F. Ras, Warsaw's
Wingspan Over State Laws: Towards a Streamlined System of Recovery, 59 J. AIR L. &
COM. 587 (1994).
103Jack v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 654, 665 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
104Id.
105Id.
10

Id.

107id.
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A. Disallow Recovery for Emotional Distress
The first approach is to disallow recovery for all emotional distress, even
if bodily injury occurs." 8 Under this approach, an injured passenger could
recover only pecuniary loss, such as medical expenses and lost income."°
This approach is in accord with the Floyd Court's narrow reading of
Article 17's reference to bodily injury." 0 Denying emotional distress
damages is also appropriate in light of the state of the law in many countries
at the time of Warsaw Convention."' And, because this approach is so
restrictive on passengers' rights, it furthers the pro-airline industry goals of
the Convention."'
This approach is unacceptable, however, because it provides such minimal
compensation for passengers who may have suffered traumatic injuries, either
physical or mental." 3 The drafters of the Warsaw Convention attempted
to strike a balance between passengers and airlines; this approach is too one
sided." 4 Further, even though many jurisdictions denied recovery for
mental distress in 1929, France recognized such claims, as did other
countries, when accompanied by physical impact or manifestation."'
Because of the numerous problems with this approach, American courts have
not adopted it.
B. Allow Recovery for All Emotional Distress, as Long as a Bodily Injury
Occurs

The second approach is to allow recovery for all emotional distress, as
long as a bodily injury occurs, regardless of the connection between the
distress and the bodily injury." 6 Thus, a passenger with a scratched arm
could recover for the trauma and fear due to the plane crash; the bodily

0

Id.
" Id In Floyd, the Court noted that "such a remedy was unknown in many, if not most,
jurisdictions in 1929." Floyd, 499 U.S. at 545.
"2 Jack, 854 F. Supp. at 665.
11

113 Id.
114 Id.
115Id.
116Id.

1995]

WARSAW CONVENTION

515

injury opens the door to liability for emotional distress." 7
In Chendrimadav. Air-India,' the court adopted this approach. There,
the plaintiff brought suit for injuries arising out of a trip from New York to
Bombay." 9 At a scheduled stop in Delhi, the plane was grounded for
eleven and a half hours due to heavy fog.' ° The plaintiffs alleged that
they were not allowed to leave the plane to go into the terminal and were not
given anything to eat during the delay.'
The plaintiffs claimed that as a
result they became weak, experienced nausea, suffered severe cramps, pain
and anguish and suffered malnutrition as well as mental injury."n Because
the plaintiffs alleged physical injury, the court denied Air-India's motion for
summary judgement."2
This approach is consistent with a broad reading of Article 17's imposition
'
of liability for "damage sustained in the event of ... bodily injury."' 2
Significantly, the drafters did not use the phrase "damage caused by ...

117id.
8

802 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).

119Id

at 1090.

120 id.
121 Id,
2Id. at 1092.
'23Id. One paragraph of the court's opinion is of particular relevance:
As discussed above, the Supreme Court held in the Floyd case that a
passenger cannot recover for purely emotional or mental injuries absent
physical injury or manifestation of physical injury. Therefore, to survive
Floyd, plaintiffs must allege a physical injury or a manifestation of
physical injury. The Court finds that plaintiffs allegations satisfy this
requirement. It should be understood that the Court is not ruling that as
a matter of law being held on an airplane for over eleven hours without
food is a physical injury in and of itself. If a passenger in the same
position as plaintiffs had not exhibited any physical manifestation of
injury as a result of being held without food, but only alleged emotional
injury, no action would lie. Of course, plaintiffs must still prove their
alleged physical injuries at trial to recover, but plaintiffs have demonstrated that there is a genuine issue of material fact in dispute which cannot
be resolved on a motion for summary judgement. In reaching this
conclusion we of course have determined that the 'manifestation of
physical injury' which is a prerequisiteto an action under Floyd need not
resultfrom a suddenly inflicted trauma,but may, as is alleged here, result
from other causes for which the carrieris responsible.
Id. (emphasis added).
4 Jack v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 654, 666 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
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bodily injury," which would have served as a signal that any mental distress
must be connected to the bodily injury." z This approach is also supported
by the fact that the Floyd Court did not mention a need for a causal
connection between bodily injury and emotional distress."
Further, this
approach is in line with the approach to mental distress taken in early tort
cases, where a physical impact or manifestation was a prerequisite to
recovery.127

However, this approach is undesirable for two reasons.12 First of all,
this approach treats mental distress as an independent cause of action, which
is inconsistent with precedent that dictates that the Warsaw Convention
creates a cause of action, not just a limit on remedies.'" And, secondly,
this approach treats mental distress as damages resulting from the accident,
not the injury.' 30
C. Allow Emotional Distress as Damages for Bodily Injury, Including
Distress About the Accident
Emotional distress is considered an element of the damages for bodily
injury under the third approach.1 31 Under this approach, the distress does
not need to be about the injury to be compensable. 3 2 This approach is
different from the second approach in that the distress must occur at the
same time or later than the bodily injury; one cannot, therefore, recover for
33
the fear before the impact and bodily injury under this approach.
The courts in the cases concerning the downing of Korean Air Lines
Flight KE 007 on September 1, 1983, while the plane was in route from

125 Id.
2

16

id.

"27
Id. Under early tort law, the physical impact or manifestation was seen as proof that
the emotional distress was not faked. Id.
128id.

'9 Id. See supra note 37.
" Jack, 854 F. Supp. at 666. This is problematic under the wording of Article 17 of the
Convention and the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392
(1985), where the Court noted that" 'the text of Article 17 refers to an accident which caused
the passenger's injury, and not to an accident which is the passenger's injury.' " Jack, 854
F. Supp. at 666 (quoting Saks, 470 U.S. at 398).
"' Jack, 854 F. Supp. at 666.
132 d

133Id.

1995]

WARSAW CONVENTION

New York to Seoul, adopted this approach."
There, the plane strayed
into Soviet airspace and was intercepted and destroyed by Soviet military
aircraft over the Sea of Japan; all 269 passengers were killed.13
The numerous actions filed around the country for wrongful death of the
deceased passengers were consolidated for common pre-trial proceedings and
the trial of the common issue of liability."
After a jury found that
Korean Air Lines engaged in willful misconduct that proximately caused the
deaths, the individual cases were returned to the various jurisdictions where
they had been filed in order to determine compensatory damages for each

plaintiff.137
One court first noted that the 269 passengers aboard the plane were alive
and conscious for ten or eleven minutes after the plane was hit by the missile
and before it hit the sea, and possibly for a period thereafter.1 38 The court
then recognized that the passengers probably endured a considerable amount
of emotional and physical (due to rapid decompression) pain during that
period which ended in the death they were anticipating.13 9 Consequently,
the court held, "This is pain and suffering accompanied by physical injury,
and logically must be permitted by Floyd."'"
The logic behind the third approach is best illustrated by the comments of
14
the court in In re Air Crash DisasterNear Honolulu, Hawaii: 1
The Convention itself does not specify the elements of
damages which a plaintiff might recover under Article 17.
Instead, "commentators and case law are in accord that the
Convention leaves the measure of damages to the internal
1 42
law of parties to the Convention."

134

Id.; Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 814 F. Supp. 605, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1993),

modified, 43 F.3d 18 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 1689 (1995).
'35Zicherman, 814 F. Supp. at 606.
'3 Id. See In re Korean Air
137 Zicherman, 814 F. Supp.

Lines Disaster, 575 F. Supp. 342 (J.P.M.L. 1983).
at 606. The jury also awarded punitive damages, but on
appeal they were set aside as non-recoverable in a Warsaw Convention Case. Id. See In re
Korean Airlines Disaster, 932 F.2d 1475, 1490 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 994 (1991).
138In re Korean Air Lines Disaster, 814 F. Supp. 592, 598 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
139 Id.

'40Id. See also In re Korean Air Lines Disaster, 807 F. Supp. 1073 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
141 783
142Id.

F. Supp. 1261 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
at 1264 (quoting In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland, 928 F.2d 1267, 1283

(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 920 (1991)).
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Grafted onto our common law tradition, and recognizing the
Warsaw Convention's adoption of "internal law" with
respect to the measure of damages, Article 17 must be read
to create a cause of action which encompasses the remedies
traditionally provided by common law in personal 1 injury
43
actions, wrongful death actions, and survival actions.
Although there is little federal common law on emotional distress, federal
courts have indicated that emotional distress damages would be allowed for
distress about the plane crash, not just the distress about the injury.144 This
approach-analogizing to other areas of federal common law-is unsatisfactory because of the uniqueness of the45 Warsaw Convention's exclusion of
recovery for pure emotional distress.
D. Allow Recovery Only for Emotional Distress Flowing from a Bodily
Injury
Under the fourth approach, emotional distress flowing from the bodily
injury is an element of damages allowed for the bodily injury."4 Thus,
damages are allowed for emotional distress only to the extent the emotional
distress is caused by the bodily injury. 47 A passenger may, therefore,
recover for fear related to his broken leg, but not for fear related to the plane
crash." Under this approach, emotional distress can also have a separate
role as the causal link between the accident and the bodily injury; a
passenger may, for example, recover for a heart attack caused by the distress

43

Id. at 1265.

144Jack

v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 654, 667 (N.D. Cal. 1994). See, e.g.,
Hall v. Ochs, 817 F.2d 920 (1st Cir. 1987) (allowing emotional distress damages for the
trauma involved in a racially motivated arrest, not just for the minor injuries); Lentz v. MIV
Eastern Grace, CIV. No. 85-1078-FR, 1988 WL 135809 (D. Or. Dec. 2, 1988) (awarding

emotional distress damages for a seaman's discomfort around boats after an accident in which
his boat was hit, although he suffered only bumps and bruises in the accident). Jack, 854 F.

Supp. at 667.
45Jack, 854 F. Supp. at 667. See discussion supra notes 70-102 and accompanying text.
'46Jack, 854 F. Supp. at 667.
147Id.
14 id.
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of the plane crash. 49
In Jack v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,"'5 the court adopted this approach.
Jack involved the aborted takeoff, crash and fire of TWA Flight 843 when
departing New York's John F. Kennedy Airport for San Francisco.15 1 All
the passengers survived despite the fact that fire completely destroyed the
plane.15 During the aborted takeoff and evacuation, many of the passengers suffered minor physical injuries; many were traumatized by the
accident.55 The passengers filed suit, seeking damages for physical
injuries and emotional distress, and TWA filed motions for summary
judgement.' 54
The court held that the plaintiffs with impact injuries could recover for
their impact injuries, the emotional distress flowing from their impact
injuries and any physical manifestations of their emotional distress. 5
Further, the court decided that the plaintiffs with physical manifestations
could recover for the manifestations and any distress flowing from the
manifestations, but that they could not recover damages for the emotional
distress that led to the manifestations.5 6 The court was careful to note

149 Id. The comments of the court in Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 314 N.E.2d
848 (Ct. App. N.Y. 1974), help to illustrate the reasoning behind this position:
[T]he compensable injuries must be 'bodily' injuries but there may be an
intermediate causal link which is 'mental' between the cause-the
accident-and the effect-the 'bodily injury'. And once that predicate of
liability--the 'bodily injury'-is established, then the damages sustained
as a result of the 'bodily injury' are compensable including mental
suffering ....
However, only the damages flowing from the 'bodily
injury', whatever the causal link, are compensable ....

We hold, therefore, that defendant is liable for plaintiffs palpable,
objective bodily injuries, including those caused by the psychic trauma of
the hijacking, and for the damages flowing from those bodily injuries, but
not for the trauma as such or for the nonbodily or behavioral manifestations of that trauma.
Id. at 857.
'50 854 F. Supp. at 654.
15 Id. at 657.
The case fell under the Warsaw Convention because many of the
passengers held tickets for international flights. Id.
152 id.
153 m
15

id.

15'Id.
156Id.

at 668.
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that, in both instances, the emotional distress was limited to the distress
about the physical impact or manifestation (the bodily injury) and that
recovery was not allowed for the distress about the accident itself.'57
Of the four approaches discussed herein, this fourth one is the most
desirable for a number of reasons. First, this approach prevents serious
158
inequities among the passengers subject to the Warsaw Convention.
Getting scratched on the way down an evacuation slide should not enable
one passenger to obtain a much greater recovery than an unscratched fellow
passenger who was equally terrified by the plane crash, and the fourth
approach achieves this result.1 59 And, this approach is consistent with the
intentions of the drafters of the Warsaw Convention by making passengers'
recoveries more reasonable and predictable." 6 This approach also allows
for greater recovery with more severe injuries, presuming that more distress
flows from more serious injuries.' 6 ' Further, this approach even permits
recovery in wrongful death cases. 62
The fourth approach does, however, have one drawback. The difficulty
is that emotional damages might not be allowed in a case like that involving
the Korean Air Lines plane that was shot down in Soviet airspace. 63 For,
if no impact injuries were suffered until the plane hit the water, no recovery
would be allowed for the ten or eleven minutes of pre-crash terror. 64
The numerous benefits of the fourth approach outweigh its one drawback.
Courts should, therefore, adopt it and allow recovery only for emotional
distress flowing from a bodily injury.

157 Id. TWA's motion for summary judgement was granted as to the 27 plaintiffs
who
complained of psychic trauma but did not complain of impact injuries or physical
manifestations of emotional distress; TWA's motion for summary judgement was denied as
to the 33 plaintiffs who claimed impact injuries and/or physical manifestation of their
emotional distress. Id
158 Id.

159 Id.
60

1 Id.
161Id.

'62 Id. Survivors may recover for physical manifestations of their grief at the loss of a

loved one. Id
163id.
16

id.
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V. CONCLUSION

In Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd,1 65 the United States Supreme Court
resc ved the question debated among lower federal courts of whether Article
17 of the Warsaw Convention allows recovery for mental or psychic injuries
unaccompanied by physical injury or physical manifestation of injury by
holding that "an air carrier cannot be held liable under Article 17 when an
accident has not caused a passenger to suffer death, physical injury, or
physical manifestation of injury."' 66 The Court left unanswered the
question of whether a passenger can recover for mental injuries that are
accompanied by physical injuries. 6
There are four possible ways to
answer this question: 1) to disallow recovery for emotional distress, 2) to
allow recovery for all emotional distress, as long as a bodily injury occurs,
3) to allow emotional distress as damages for bodily injury, including
distress about the accident and 4) to allow recovery only for emotional
distress flowing from a bodily injury."
An analysis of these four approaches reveals that the fourth and final one-to allow recovery only for
emotional distress flowing from a bodily injury-is the most appropriate.
The benefits of this approach include preventing inequities among passengers
subject to the Warsaw Convention, furthering the intentions of the drafters
of the Convention by making passengers' recoveries more reasonable and
predictable, allowing for greater recovery with more severe injuries and
permitting recovery in wrongful death cases.

'6'499 U.S. at 530.

'6Id. at 552.
167 Id.

'6Jack, 854 F. Supp. at 665.

